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• This research concerns the impact of tax and 
tax-credit reform on working decisions.
• It looks at the impact and the ‘optimal’ design
• Two questions:
– How should we measure the impact of tax 
and tax-credits on work decisions?
– How should we assess the optimality of tax 
and tax-credit proposals?
• Focus on single mothers and the UK reforms
Tax-Credit Policies for Low Income Families2
• Sequence of Tax Credit expansions
–F C   (family credit) before 2000, expanded early in 
1990s
–W F T C   (working families tax credit) reform in 2000, 
and subsequent expansions in 2002
– influenced by the success of the EITC expansion in 
the US
– especially generous to families with young children
•W T C (working tax credit) and CTC (child tax 
credit) reform in 2004
– extension of eligibility to individuals without 
children
Tax Credit reforms in the UK
The WFTC Reform
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• Credit depends on earnings and number of 
children:
– Phase-in: credit is flat percentage of earned 
income or jump in at minimum hours 
threshold
– Flat range: receive maximum credit
– Phase-out: credit is phased out at a flat rate
• Credit based on family earnings
– Creating ‘interesting’ incentives among 
couples
General form of Earned Income Tax Credits
EITC Schedule in US – Single Parent Families, 2004
¾ Larger credit, covering higher earners for families with 
two or more children.
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• Does the WTFC represent an optimal transfer for 
low income families?
• New insights from optimal tax theory show some 
negative marginal tax rates can be an optimal design
• Labour supply estimation suggest extensive margin 
is more responsive to incentives than intensive
margin
• This turns out to be a key observation for optimal 
tax design
Can a WFTC type design be ‘optimal’?
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In the research design reported here, the analysis of 
tax-credit policy is tackled in two steps:
• The first step is a positive analysis of how 
household work decisions respond. There are two 
empirical approaches  - both prove useful:
(a) A ‘quasi-experimental’ evaluation of the impact 
of historic reforms
(b) A ‘structural’ estimation of individual behaviour 
based on a general discrete choice model
• The second step is the normative analysis or optimal 
policy analysis
The Analysis of Tax Credit Policies6
• Two ‘new’ approaches
• solve directly given the microeconometric estimates 
of discrete choice behaviour and tax-benefit 
constraints
• take approximations in terms of underlying 
elasticities and welfare weights on different incomes 
– Diamond/Saez
• choose transfers and taxes ‘T’ to maximise welfare
• extend the standard Mirrlees framework to allow for 
responses at the extensive and intensive margin
A simple optimal design framework
Suppose U is the ‘utility’ of a single mother
A (simple) optimal tax framework
from working h hours with net income c, where X 
are observable characteristics of her and her child 
and ε represents unobserved characteristics.
Budget constraint:
(,; ) cw h T w h X ≡−
(,; , ) UchXε
Choose  h from a set of discrete alternatives 
reflecting part-time work, full-time work etc. 7
Social welfare, for single parents of type X
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The tax structure T(X) is chosen to maximise W,  
subject to:
A simple optimal tax/tax-credit framework
where Γ is the social welfare transformation.
• Suppose we distinguish between earnings groups
– ‘no’ earners: group 0
– ‘higher’ earners groups i = 1, 2,…
• Suppose the social welfare weight is higher for 
group 0, and monotonically decreasing
• Choose taxes (and transfers) T to maximise 
welfare
• Can derive expressions in terms of elasticities and 
social welfare weights across the income 
distribution
Simplified expressions - for intuition8
Optimal design gives: 
0 1 g >
where
i ζ is the labour supply elasticity
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i T − is the subsidy given to group i
i c is the net of tax income for that group 
is the social welfare weight for group i i g
and            , with the weighted sum of g’s =1
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Suppose we now introduce an intensive and extensive 
margin
where 
a ‘large’ extensive elasticity can ‘turn around’ the impact of 
social weights - implying a higher transfer to low wage 
workers than to those out of work – a tax-credit
l , jj j gg k η =+
The intensive and extensive margin
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i ζ is the intensive elasticity
and  j η is the extensive elasticity
0
0
After Tax 
Income
Earnings
A ‘Typical’ Optimal Schedule
‘NIT adapted’ EITC 
‘bubble’11
The US Earned Income Tax Credit
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• work eligibility
– 16 or more hours per week
• family eligibility
– children (in full time education or younger)
• income eligibility
– if a family's net income is below a certain 
threshold, adult credit plus age-dependent 
amounts for each child
– if income is above the threshold then the amount 
of credit is tapered away at 55% per extra pound 
of net income – previously 70%
The WFTC design: eligibility criteria12
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The UK and US tax credit systems compared
• A puzzle on the relative impact of WFTC and EITC
• Is this an ‘optimal’ design given efficiency and 
distributional considerations:
• Is an hours eligibility rule optimal?
• At what hours point should it be set?
• Is the overall structure of the WFTC optimal?
The WFTC design13
• interaction with other benefits and taxes matter
– differing size of the ‘treatment’ across eligibles
• coincident reforms to Income Support (IS)
– different direction of these reforms to US 
Unlike the US EITC the credit is based on net 
(rather than gross) family income
Interactions with other taxes and benefits
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The interaction with other benefits
• Requires a reliable structural simulation model 
that captures decisions and the budget constraint 
accurately
• Two components:
• budget constraint is approximated by number 
of discrete points. 
• choose hours of work according to discrete 
choice model with hours options:
Assessing the design16
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• budget constraint that allows for tax/benefit 
interactions 
• discrete decisions over hours worked
• heterogeneity – demographics, ethnicity,., unobs. het.
• fixed costs of work – obs. and unobs. het.
• stigma/hassle costs – take-up versus eligibility
• childcare costs
• do individuals behave this way?
Key features of a ‘realistic’ structural model
Specifying a structural labour supply model
(, ) (, ) hh h Uhy uhy ε = +
• Where        is a discrete hours choice specific error h ε
22
11 22 12 1 2 (, ) hh h h h Uhy y h yh y h α αα β β ε ≈++ + + +
• Heterogeneity enters model through     and α β
• For lone parents say, utility function defined over net 
income and hours:
• Approximate function by:
- observed and unobserved heterogeneity18
{ } { } P r [ ] e x p( ,) e x p( ,)
jk jj h k h
k
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• lone parents choose hrs/wk point                    
• to maximise utility. With extreme value errors:
{} 0,10,19,26,33,40 h ∈
• Model additionally allows for:
• Unobserved work-related (fixed) costs, WRC
• Childcare costs, CC
• Programme participation (hassle or ‘stigma’) costs, P
Specifying a structural labour supply model
Take-up and WFTC
Variation in take-up probability with entitlement to FC/WFTC
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Estimation
• Data from 1995-2003 (Family Resources Survey)
– 1995-1999: pre-reform estimation data (ex-ante)
– 2002-2003: ‘post-reform’ validation sample 
– Use complete sample for ex-ante analysis of 2004 
and more recent reform proposals
Structural Model Elasticities
1.1295 Participation elasticity
0.0829 0.4920 0.1618 300
0.2344 0.7137 0.1723 220
0.3944 0.7709 0.1453 140
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0.3966 0
Intensive Extensive Density Earnings
(a) Youngest Child Aged 11-1820
Structural Model Elasticities
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• Check the robustness of the structural model by the 
ability to simulate the impact of the WFTC reform 
Structural Evaluation Simulation Results: 
WFTC Expansion
Notes: Simulated on FRS data; Standard errors in italics.
All: 5.12 without change in take-up – key impact effect
All y-child y-child y-child y-child
0 to 2 3 to 4 5 to 10 11 to 18
Change in employment rate:  5.95 3.09 7.56 7.54 4.96
0.74 0.59 0.91 0.85 0.68
Average change in hours:  1.79 0.71 2.09 2.35 1.65
0.2 0.14 0.23 0.34 0.221
Adult and Child Elements of the WFTC
Note: All monetary amounts are expressed in April 2003 prices.
Adult Child Awards by Age
child child child
0 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 18
Mar-99 £58.80 £16.40 £22.60 £28.00
Oct-99 £56.60 £21.50 £22.60 £28.00
Mar-00 £56.60 £22.60 £22.60 £28.00
Jun-01 £61.90 £27.30 £27.30 £28.00
Jun-02 £64.40 £27.30 £27.30 £28.00
Increase 19.70% 66.40% 20.50% 0.00%
Impact of WFTC reform on lone parent, 2 children
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• Notes: Two children under 5. Assumes hourly wage of £4.10, no housing costs or council tax 
liability and no childcare costs.22
child child child
0 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 18
Mar-99 £21.90 £28.00 £33.50
Oct-99 £27.00 £28.00 £33.50
Mar-00 £28.40 £28.40 £33.80
Mar-01 £33.00 £33.00 £33.80
Oct-01 £34.50 £34.50 £35.40
Mar-02 £34.50 £34.50 £35.40
Increase 57.50% 23.30% 5.70%
Child Rates of Income Support
Note: All monetary amounts are expressed in April 2003 prices.
Impact of WFTC & increases in welfare benefit 
on lone parent, 2 children
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• Notes: Two children under 5. Assumes hourly wage of £4.10, no housing costs or council tax 
liability and no childcare costs.23
Structural Evaluation Simulation Results: 
All Reforms
Notes: Simulated on FRS data; Standard errors in italics.
All y-child y-child y-child y-child
0 to 2 3 to 4 5 to 10 11 to 18
Change in employment rate:  3.68 0.65 4.53 4.83 4.03
0.84 0 . 6 0 . 9 90 . 9 40 . 7 1
Average change in hours:  1.02 0.01 1.15 1.41 1.24
0.23 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.22
• Compare structural model simulations based on 
estimated parameters to quasi-experimental ex-post 
evaluation 
• The idea is to simulate the quasi-experimental estimate 
(moment)
• comparing work decisions of  eligible versus those who 
are not eligible before and after the reform
• identify average employment impact on eligibles by 
assuming a structure on unobservables
– separability
– common trends across groups
– invariance in group heterogeneity over time
• conditional on a set of (matching) covariates X
Robustness of the structural model:24
Employment rates of single women in the UK
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Lone parents
Single Women without children
Difference-in-Differences: Lone Mothers Employment
233,208 0.33 3.81 Labour Force 
Survey
74,959 0.81 3.57 Family 
Resources 
Survey
Sample Size Standard 
Error
Marginal 
Effect
Single Women
Data: Spring 1996 – Spring 2003.
Drop: Summer 1999 – Spring 2000 inclusive; individuals aged over 45.
Outcome: employment. Average impact  x 100, employment percentage.
Matching Covariates: age, education, region, ethnicity,..25
•T h e   simulated diff-in-diff parameter from the structural 
evaluation model is precise and does not differ 
significantly from the diff-in-diff estimate
• Compare simulated diff-in-diff moment with diff-in-diff 
– .29 (.73), chi-square p-value .57
• Consider additional moments
– education: low education: 0.33 (.41) 
– youngest child interaction 
• Youngest child aged < 5: .59 (. 51)
• Youngest child aged 5-10: .31 (.35)
Evaluation of the ex-ante model
What of the ‘optimal’ design?
• Given the structural discrete choice estimates and the 
implied elasticities at extensive and intensive margin, we 
can pose the question:
– what is the optimal tax and transfer schedule?
– is the WFTC+ ‘optimal’ for reasonable social welfare 
weights?
{}
1
(|) ( e x p) 1 UU
θ θ
θ
Γ= −
• When θ is negative, the function favours the equality 
of utilities; We solve the schedule for a series of 
values – central estimates us -0.226
Should there be an hours eligibility condition or ‘bonus’?
• Is it optimal to have a ‘minimum hours’
eligibility?
• If we can have a 16 hours condition, what 
should it look like?
• Is 16 the optimal choice? 
An Optimal Schedule, Youngest Child Aged 0-4 
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An Optimal Schedule, Youngest Child Aged 11-18 
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An Optimal Schedule, Youngest Child Aged 0-4 
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An Optimal Schedule, Impact on Hours worked, 
Youngest Child Aged 5-10 
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The impact of welfare weights: Youngest Child Aged 5-10 
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Implications?
• Resolved the US-EITC, UK-WFTC puzzle
• WFTC/IS type schedule looks optimal overall
But
• Age of children matter 
– Only reduce current marginal tax rates on 
participation for parents with children of 
school age
• Hours rules can be optimal
• No hours conditioning for mothers with youngest 
child less than 5, higher hours condition for 
mothers with older child.
• Administration and integration
• What of work experience and wages?
• Indeed what is the long-term program impact on 
gross wages?
• Couples decision making?
– UK has moved to individual income taxation 
but in-work tax credits are family income based
– targeting in collective labour supply models
• What impact on fertility and family formation?
Extensions: ….32
Reform impacts on budget constraints for mother in couple
Notes: Two children under 5. Assumes hourly wage of £4.10, no housing costs or council tax 
liability and no childcare costs.
The first earner in the couple is assumed to earn £300 per week in 2002 prices.
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• Work experience and earnings?
– Card and Hyslop (2004)
– SSP Canadian single parents
• ERA results for the UK?
Experience and Wages33
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SSP experiment: dynamic effects on wages and productivity?34
•T h e   Integrated Family Supplement? 
– The ‘IFS’
• Mirrlees Review…
– www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview
Extensions: More to do….
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Tax-Credit Policies for Low 
Income Families: 
Impact and Optimality
Extra Slides
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
No Work 0.753 0.762 0.769 0.770 0.774 0.767 0.775
child
Age 26.789 26.906 26.799 26.957 27.104 27.317 27.450
Non-white 0.073 0.077 0.080 0.084 0.091 0.098 0.102
Left education before 16 0.078 0.072 0.062 0.057 0.052 0.047 0.043
Left education at 16 or 17 0.394 0.381 0.375 0.375 0.363 0.353 0.356
London and South-East 0.341 0.350 0.349 0.347 0.354 0.360 0.352
Rented accommodation 0.343 0.353 0.358 0.340 0.339 0.350 0.346
Observations 26243 24463 24410 23987 22558 23517 22846
Child Work 0.417 0.425 0.444 0.464 0.477 0.487 0.496
Age 32.330 32.580 32.655 32.863 33.181 33.280 33.288
Non-white 0.100 0.099 0.091 0.098 0.106 0.112 0.111
Left education before 16 0.209 0.196 0.189 0.169 0.154 0.161 0.155
Left education at 16 or 17 0.632 0.627 0.633 0.635 0.646 0.641 0.637
London and South-East 0.285 0.285 0.285 0.293 0.294 0.303 0.301
Rented accommodation 0.686 0.704 0.708 0.696 0.697 0.694 0.676
Number of kids 1.783 1.785 1.791 1.784 1.778 1.776 1.794
Age of youngest child 6.187 6.249 6.272 6.414 6.592 6.612 6.676
Observations 14613 14172 14550 14343 13572 14097 13996
Table A1: Sample Descriptives for Single Women37
Tax
Transfers
P: take-up
the tax-credit payment function                     depends on:
hours (through the hours condition of entitlement) 
other income I
demographic characteristics X
Net Income schedule :
or
01 ( ,) (,,) (,,) hP h y w h I tw hI C whI P whI =+ − − + Ψ + Ψ

1(,,) hP hP yyPw h I =+ Ψ
1(,,) whI Ψ
Utility ‘cost’ of receiving in-work support
Take-up
  Xu
UPhj, yhj  1 −C,P  1  Uhj, yhj −C.
claim  1 in FC/WFTC at hours hj if:
  Uhj, yhj  1 − C − Uhj, yhj − C
where C is the fixed cost of work. The utility cost among those who are 
eligible for WFTC at hours hj and choose to claim WFTC must not 
exceed the utility gain from receipt of WFTC transfer income relative 
to non-receipt:
u  U U  Uhj, yhj  1 −C−Uhj, yhj −C−X where38
and                            is ‘cost’ of receiving in-work support.
Preferences and Take-Up
UPh,yhP,P;C  11 yh P 1 −C2 22h2 12 yh P 1 −Ch
 1 yh P 1 −C 2hhP −P Eh
 Uh, yh P 1 −C−P Eh,
The introduction of these additional terms is important in evaluation 
of a reform which increases generosity
  X u
Eh  11  0 where                                 is an indicator of eligibility at hours h,
Preferences:
C represents the ‘fixed cost’ of work
Stochastic specification
1  X11x uy
2  X22x uh
11  X1111x
22  X2222x
12  X1212x
WRC1  Xf1f1 uf
WRC2  Xf2f2
Fixed costs of work
Stochastic Preferences39
Childcare Costs
hcc  Gh|Xcc
Ch;Xf,Xcc,pc,uf  WRC1Ih1 WRC2Ih2pc hcc
 Xf1f1 ufIh1Xf2f2Ih2pc Gh|Xcc
At pricepc foranhourof childcare perchild
To estimate the childcare price per child pc, we compute the 
empirical distribution of hourly child-care costs for various 
groups of working mothers defined by their family status and 
number and age of children Xcc.
Prh  hj,P  p|X,u 
where u  u w,uy,uh,u cc,uf
expUhj, yhj
phj,Pp
∑
k1
J
maxexpUhk, yhk
,P0,EhkexpUhk, yhk
hk,P1
Choice probabilities:40
Likelihood specification
where
logL  ∑ilog
u−u

uUjPrh  hj,P  1|X,u
1hhj,Ehj1,P1fudu

uUjPrh  hj,P  0|X,u
1hhj,Ehj1,P0fudu

ujPrh  hj,P  0|X,u
1hhj,Ehj0fudu
fu−udu−u
Pr( , | , ) j hh Pp X u ==
These preferences, fixed costs, childcare costs and stigma 
cost expressions provide the choice probabilities:
From which we construct the sample log likelihood:
(,,,, ) uw y h f c c uu u u u u
η − =
Likelihood specification
u−u  uw,uy,uh,uf,ucc
where
logL  ∑ilog
u−u

uUjPrh  hj,P  1|X,u
1hhj,Ehj1,P1fudu

uUjPrh  hj,P  0|X,u
1hhj,Ehj1,P0fudu

ujPrh  hj,P  0|X,u
1hhj,Ehj0fudu
fu−udu−u41
Structural Evaluation Model: Parameter Estimates42
Award increased 
by 70% of 
childcare 
expenses up 
to £135 (£200) 
for 1 (more 
than 1) child 
under 15
Award increased 
by 70% of 
childcare 
expenses up 
to £100 (£150) 
for 1 (more 
than 1) child 
under 15
Award increased 
by 70% of 
childcare 
expenses up 
to £100 (£150) 
for 1 (more 
than 1) child 
under 15
Childcare 
expenses up to 
£60 (£100) for 1 
(more than 1) 
child under 12 
disregarded 
when  calc 
income
Childcare
55% of earnings 
after income 
tax and NI
55% of earnings 
after income 
tax and NI
55% of earnings 
after income 
tax and NI
70% of earnings 
after income 
tax and NI
Taper
94.5 91.45 90 80.65 Threshold
11.65 11.25 11.05 11.05 30 hour 
27.2 26.35 25.95 25.95 over 16
26.45 25.6 20.9 20.9 11 to 16
26.45 25.6 19.85 15.15 under 11
Child Credit
62.5 53.15 52.3 49.8 Basic Credit
(WFTC) (WFTC) (WFTC) (FC)
Jun-02 Jun-00 Oct-99 Apr-9943
Changes in marginal tax rates: all working parents
Marginal rates at the bottom remain high
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An Optimal Schedule, Youngest Child Aged 5-10 
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